Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It-Yourself by Gauthier, David
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 10
Number 1 SUMMER 1979 Volume 10 Article 6
1979
Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It-
Yourself
David Gauthier
University of Toronto
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
Gauthier, David (1979) "Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It-Yourself," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 10 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol10/iss1/6
DAVID GAUTHIER 
Professor of Philosophy 
University of Toronto 
1
Gauthier: Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It-Yourself
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1979
Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do·lt·Yourself Primer 
by 
David Gauthier 
1. "The theory of justice," according to John Rawls, "is a part, perhaps the 
most slgnJflcant part, of the theory of rational choice."1 Lei us reflect on the 
significance of this claim. 
Choice is the endeavour to realize one among several alternative possible 
states of affairs. The rationality which may be exhibited in choice is conceived in 
maximizing terms. A numerical measure is applied to the alternative possibilities, 
and choice among them is rational if and only if one endeavours to realize that 
possibility which has been assigned the greatest number. This measure is associated 
with preference; the alternative possible state of affairs are ordered preferentially, 
and the numerical measure, which is termed utility, is so established that greater 
utility indicates greater preference. The complications of this procedure need not 
concern us here.2 What is important is that rational choice ts conceived as prefer­
ence-based choice, so that the rationally chosen state of affairs is the most pref�rred 
among the alternative possibilities. 
John Rawls' claim, therefore, is that the theory of justice is the most signifi­
cant part of the theory of preference-based choice. But this claim must seem quite 
implausible. Justice is a moral virtue - indeed, some would claim that justice is the 
central moral virtue. 8 The theory of justice must be a part, and perhaps the most 
signific1U1t part, of the theory of morality. How can morality be part of preference· 
based choice? 
The point of morality is surely to override preference. Were we to suppose 
that one should always endeavour to realize his or her most preferred state of 
affairs, then what need would we have tor moral concepts? Why use the language 
of morality, of duties and obligations, of rightS and responsibilities, when one 
might appeal directly to each person's greatest interest? 
Y �u offer me a choice among pieces of cake. I, greedily but perfectly ration­
ally, basin_g my c�oice strictly on my preferences, select· the largest piece. "That 
isn't fair," someone complains. "Of course not," I reply. My concern was m1tO 
be fair. My concern was to get the largest piece of cake - and I did. Surely here 
the appeal to fairness, to a consideration related to justice, is intended to ovenide, 
or at least to constnlin, preference-based choice. If you suppose that I should have 
chosen with fairness in mind, then you believe that I should not have acted simply 
to gratify my greed, even though my preference was for the largest piece of cake. 
You believe that I should have considered, not only my own desires, but also the 
desires of others. 
Do examples such as this show that Rawls is wrong to treat the theory of 
justice as part of the theory of rational choice? Not at all. I shall argue that his 
claim is sound, Not that I agree with Rawls' theory of justice - that is quite 
another matter.4 But justice provides a fundamental link between morality and 
preference, a link which, I believe, we are able to formulate in a precise and defini· 
tive way. 
Indeed, I shall go farther than Rawls. In coming to understand how justice 
links morality and preference, one also realizes that our framework of moral con­
cepts is seriously outmoded. Morality has been traditionally conceived as embracing 
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the entire range of justifiable constraints on preference-based choice. But this range 
will be seen, in the light of my argument, to include at least two distinct, and 
apparently disparate, parts. One part, which I shall treat under the heading of 
distributive Justice,6 proves to be a constraint on preference·based choice which 
is based on the struc�! of some of the situations in which we make choices. This 
constraint is generated internally, within the theory of rational choice. That a con· 
straint on preference can be justified by an appeal to preferences may appear 
paradoxical, but I shall endeavour to remove the air of paradox as we proceed. And 
as the upshot of my argument I shall insist that distributive justice is not problem­
atic in principle; it may be removed from the area of speculative enquiry, and 
est.ablished securely within rational choice. The age-old philosophical problems 
about the rationality of morality are solved for the case of distributive justice. 
But the firm foundation provided for the constraints on preference-based 
choice required by distributive justice does not extend to t�ose other constraints 
which are embraced in our traditional conceptiori of morality. This is why our 
framework of moral concepts is outmoded. We must distinguish those constraints 
on preferences which can be justified by an appeal to preference itself from other, 
external constraints. The latter remains, at least for the present, within the area of 
speculative enquiry. And here the philosophical problems about the rationality of 
morality press with renewed vigour. 
2. My positive aim in this paper is to show you how we bargain our way into 
that part of morality which constitutes distributive justice. The bargain is based 
on our preferences; its outcome is an agreement which constrains our preferences; 
thus paradox ls removed. But before doing this, I want to assure you that in my 
argument; I permit no sleight-of -hand with the conception of preference, and no 
question-begging assumptions about the conception of rationality. 
I greedily take the largest piece of cake, and you reprimand me for not 
thinking of the others. Now you might claim that deep down, in my heart of 
hearts, I really do prefer to consider my fellows. You ask me to reflect. How would 
I feel were I In their shoes - or had I their appetites'? And so forth. Humpty­
Dumpty supposed that by paying words extra, we could make them mean what 
we like.6 If we pay preference extra, perhaps it will line up with morality. The 
principles of justice will then reflect our real preferences, requiring us to choose 
what we really, reflectively, deep-down prefer. Humpty-Dumpty might say this. 
But Humpty-Dumpty is proverbially confused. 
My aim is to ground the theory of distributive justice in the theory of rational 
choice. In doing this, I generate a part of moral theory from a theory which itself 
raises no moral issues. But if we insist th•t our real preferences are moral prefer­
ences, then the theory of rational choice ls converted into a part of moral theory, 
and the non-moral grounding of distributive justice Is sacrificed. Rather than show­
ing how moral considerations of justice can be generated from non-moral consid· 
erations of choice, we should be showing how seemingly non-moral considerations 
of choice are actually morally based. Paying preference extra, to make it mean 
what we like, turns our starting-point upside down - like Humpty-Dumpty after 
the fall. · 
Thus I shall not talk about "real" preferences - except to refer to what we 
actually and quite straightforwardly prefer. I really prefer the largest piece of cake. 
But, one might now say, nevertheless I have good reason to consider the preferences 
of others. Indeed, one might say, I have as much reason to consider their prefer­
ences as to consider my own. So what I should rationally choose is, not that 
16 
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state of affairs which I personally should most prefer, but rather that state of 
affairs which would best satisfy everyone's preferences. And that choice would, 
of course, be just. 
Here the sleight·of-hand concerns reason. Rational choice, as I characterized 
it iQitlally, assumes an essentially subjectivistic and instrumental conception of 
rationality. What is now: urged is that this conception il inadequate. What il rational, 
it is claimed. must be rational for everyone. On the subjective view, this is taken 
to imply only that if 1. choose rationally on the basis of ID.! preferences, then you 
choose rationally on the basis of your preferences. But it may be alle�ed that if! 
choose rationally on the basis of !r!Y preferences, then you choose rationally on 
the basis of those same preferences. On this objective view, the basis of rational 
choice must include. everyone's preferences, or no one's, unless there are intrinsic 
differences among preferences (or preferrers) such that some count, and some do 
n� . 
The objectlvistic conception of rationality might seem an ally in my attempt 
to ground the theory of distributive justice in the theory of rational choice. If 
objectivity requires that choice be based on everyone's preferen�s, then fairness 
seems implicit in the requirements of objective reason. But is objectivity correctly 
conceived as a requirement of, or a part of, rationality? Although I can not consi­
der this question here, I shall say, quite dogmatically, that I find in every defense 
of the objectivistic conception of rationality a surreptitious, if not explicit, appeal 
to moral considerations. 7 The theory of objectively rational choice is thus a part 
of moral theory, and so can not provide a non-moral grounding of distributive 
justice. 
I do not deny that rationality has implications for morality;' indeed, I hope 
to show what those implicatiorls are. But I do deny that rationality is a moral 
conception. And so I can not appeal to an · objectivistic account of rationality 
which itself depends on moral presuppositions, but only to a subjectivistlc, instru­
mental account which is clearly non-moral. A person acts rationally insofar as he 
or she seeks to maximize expected utility, where utUlty is a measure of individual 
preference. I neither need, nor will accept, any stronger premiss. 
S. 'Itle link which justice provides between morality and rational choice is dis­
covered by reflection on a phenomenon long of concern to economists, but only 
recently receiving explicit attention from philosophers. The perfectly competitive 
market, the ideal of economic theory, ls frequently marred by the presence of ex­
ternal inefftciencies. Here is a simple exampJe of an inefficiency. 
Several factories must each choose a method of waste disposal. Suppose that 
air is a free good, so that each factory may discharge erfluents into the atmosphere 
without payment or restriction. Each may then find that it minimizes disposal· 
costs by using the atmosphere as a sink for its wastes. But each factory may also 
suffer from the pollution occasi9ned by· the effluents discharged. Indeed, it may 
be that the total cost to all factories, of atmospheric pollution caused by their 
wastes, exceeds the total net benefit in discharging those wastes Into the atmo­
sphere, rather than employing the least costly non-polluting method of disposal. 
The use of the atmosphere as a sink then constitutes an external inefficiency -
external, in that each user displaces the costs of pollution onto others, and inef­
ficient, in that the total costs of pollution exceed the total increase in disposal 
costs which would be required by an alternative non-polluting method of waste 
disposal. But no factory has any incentive to adopt such an alternative; each cor· 
rectly minimizes its own costs by discharging its effiuents into the atmosphere. 
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An external inefficiency creates a severe problem for rational choice. We 
may show this by considering an ideal case, in which each person involved in a 
situation is able to choose his or her cou�e of action in the light of the actions 
selected by others. 8 Then, if the persons are rational, each wiJl select that course of 
action which he or she expects will maximize his or her own utility, given the 
actions selected by the others. Each action will then be a best reply by the agent 
to the other's actions. If in any situation the action of each is a best reply to the 
actions of the others, then the set of actions is a best reply set . .  
In the presence of an external inefficiency, the outcome of any best reply 
set of actions is sub-optimal, which ls to say that there is at least one other outcome 
possible in the situation which would better satisfy the preferences of every per­
�· 9 Thus rational choice, given an external inefficiency, leads to an outcome 
which is mutually disadvantageous, in comparison with some other outcome which 
the persons could achieve if at least some were to choose differently. 
In our example, each factory's best reply to the adoption of waste disposal 
methods by the others, is to discharge it$ own wastes into the atmosphere. But if 
each were to adopt some non-polluting alternative, then all would benefit. It may 
therefore seem that there is a straightforward solution to this problem created by 
the external inefficiency - a cooperative solution based on mutual agreement. 
All of the factories should agree to the least costly non•polluting method of waste 
disposal. It may then be urged that each factory's true best reply to the others 
consists in such mutual agreement, and since its oµtcome is optimal, the inefficiency 
disappears and there is no problem for rational cht'.!ice. 
Alas, matters are not so simple and straightforward. First, although a non· 
polluting method of waste disposal reduces total net costs, yet each factory need 
not benefit. Some factories may suffer greatly from the pollution caused by others, 
or may find some non-polluting method of waste disposal only slightly more costly 
than using the atmosphere as a sink, but other factories may suffer very little from 
pollution, or may find the increased costs of any alternative disposal method very 
great. Thus an agreement to adopt a non-polluting method of waste disposal, al· 
though beneficial on balance, may increase net costs for some factories. To avoid 
this, the agreement must provide for transfer payments, from those factories which 
would otherviise benefit most from non-pollution to those which would otherwise 
not benefit at all. But the, amount of compensation is not easily determined. In 
general, many possible arrangements will leave each factory better off than if all 
pollute, so that reaching a specific agreement, which each would rationally choose, 
raises difficulties not only in practice, but for the theory of choice. 
Furthermore, although the outcome of an agreement not to pollute may be 
optimal, and although the outcome of an agreement which includes transfer pay· 
ments may be mutually ad.vantageous, yet adherence to any agreement need not be 
the best reply course of action for any factory. Each factory would most prefer 
that all others cease using the atmosphere as a sink, while it continues polluting. 
Hence each will be tempted to defect from any agreement, however beneficial 
the agreement may be. Adherence to an agreement not to pollute, and to com­
pensate any who would not otherwise benefit, is not, in the absence of penalties 
for violation, the most preferred course of action for any factory, whether the 
other factories adhere to the agreement, or violate it. Mutual violation thus makes 
up the best reply set of actions. 
External inefficiencies thus raise two problems for rational choice. First, 
how are we to formulate a specific, optimal, mutually advantageous agreement, or 
mode of cooperation, for overcoming an Inefficiency, which each person affected 
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will consider it rational to accept? Second, how are we to ensure that rational 
persons will comply with an agreement so formulated and accepted? These prob­
le1D$ may be related, in that we may sup1>9se that compliance with an agreeme·nt 
is rational if acceptance of the agreement is also rational. But this is not evident, 
and I shall return to the problem of rational compliance in section 6. 
4. Let us now focus on th� problem of formuJating a rational agreement. An 
agreement consists of a set of actions, one for each person party to it. · 1 assume 
for the present that compliance ls assured, so that no restriction to best reply sets 
of actions is involved. Now we may say that an agreement takes effect if and only 
if each party selects the same set of actions. Hence we may represent the problem 
of formulating agreement as a problem of rational choice - the problem of choos­
ing among alternative possible states of affairs, each the outcome of a set of 
actions, one for each person involved, subject to the condition that the choice 
takes effect only if all parties select the same alternative. 
This problem arises for anyone who may find him or herself in situations 
so ·structured that external inefficiencies arise, or In other words, so structured 
that no best reply set of actions is optimal. Although not all situations invoivlng . . 
interaction among persons have this structure, there can be no assurance against 
finding oneself in �uch situations, as long as each individual's preference orderings 
among alternative possibilities are independent of the orderings of others. So this 
is a general problem which we all face. Its resolution is not to be found in the par­
ticular circumstances in which an individual finds him or herself. Rather its answer 
must be a general policy applicable to all such circumstances - and, obviously, 
applicable to all individuals. The policy which any person should adopt, who seeks 
to cooperate with his or her feHows in the face of external inefficiencies, is and 
must be identical' with the policy every other person should adopt. The content 
of an agreed set of actions will of course vary with persons, their capacities, prefer­
ences, and circumstances, but the form which their agreement takes will be per­
fectly general. 
Consider then the reasoning of a supposedly rational agent - myself - �ced 
with this problem of rational choice. Given an extemal- i nefficiency, I must be 
willlng to enter into some agreement with my fellows. Its ·expected utility to me 
must exceed the expected utility of falling to agree, which is the utility of my 
best reply to the actions I should expect others to perform In the absence of 
agreement. Its expected utility cannot exceed the greatest utility which wotild be 
compatible with others receiving only minimally more than they would In the 
absence of agreement. Thus a utility range is defined, with its lowest point the 
utility of no agreement, and its highest point the maximum utllity compatible 
with others· receiving their "no-agreement" utility. Each person will define such a 
utility range for him or herself, and only sets of actions Which assure everyone a 
utility within his or her range will be candidates for agreement. 
In choosing among candidates some compromise will be required. I must 
recognize that I am involved in a bargaining situation, and must make some � 
cession.10 How do I decide the magnitude of the concession which my agreement 
to some set of actions would require? The answer is implicit  in the conception of 
a utility range. The lowest point of my range represents my point of total con· 
cession, in which I gain nothing from agreement. The highest point represents !!Q. 
concession, in which I gain everything. Any intermediate point may be represented 
as a proportion of my total concession. Not only will this measure my concession; 
it will relate it to the concessions of others. Two persons make equal concessions 
19 
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in a situation if and only if each concedes the same proportion of his or her total 
concession. 
Each set of actions which is a candidate for agreement may be represented 
also as a set of concessions, one tor each person. Each such set must have a largest 
member - the maximum concession required tor agreement to be reached on that 
set. Some possible set of concessions must have a largest member which is !!Q. 
greater than the largest member of any alternative set. This is the minimax con­
cession - the smallest, or minimum, among all possible largest, or maximum con· 
cessions. 
If there is to be agreement, then someone must make a concession at least 
equal to the minimax. Now if it is not rational for me to make such a concession, 
then, since -the policy which is rational tor.. me is rational tor everyone, it is not 
rational tor any person to make such a concession, and there can be no rational 
agreement. But it is rational for me to enter into an agreement; hence it must 
be rational for me to make a minimax concession. Furthermore, since agreement 
can be reached without any person making a larger concession, and since it cannot 
be rational for me to make a greater concession than necessary, it cannot be 
rational for me to make a concession larger than the minimax. Hence it is rational 
for me to enter into any agreement requiring at most the minimax. concession 
from me. Since everyone reasons similarly, bargaining among rational persons pro­
ceeds on the principle of minimax concession. And this solves the problem of 
rational choice occasioned by external inefficiencies. 
We have now characterized a rational bargain. I must next argue that the prin· 
ciple of minimax concession captures our conception of distributive justice, in 
characterizing a bargain which is fair as well as rational. And ·I must also argue 
that the principle constitutes a constraint on preference-based choice, even though 
it is, as I have shown, itself the outcome of a preference-based choice. Thus I 
must show that in acting on the principle of minimax concession, we enter into 
bargains which are fair, and which constrain preference - or in other words, we 
bargain our way into morally binding anangements. 
One word of warning ls in place before proceedlni, Although we may liter­
ally bargain our way into moral constraints in some contexts, references to bar­
gains and agreements are to be understood hypothetically. We face externalities 
and, if we are rational, we cooperate to overcome them. We may then assess our 
mode of cooperation as if it were the outcome of a bargain. But we need suppose 
no actual bargain or agreement. 
6. Under what conditions is a state of affairs distributively just? The presence 
of more than one person (or perhaps of more than one sentient being) gives rise 
to a "distribution" of utilities, but this ls not sufficient to raise issues of justice. If 
a state of affaJrs is said to be just or unjust, there must be at least one altemaUve to 
it, the variation in the utillty-levels of different persons among alternatives must be at 
least partially interdependent, and the selection among alternatives must be at least 
partially a matter of human .choice. These conditions are required if any com· 
parison of the utilities received by different persons is to have moral significance. 
For distributive justice to have significance, distributive considerations must be 
relevant to the choice among the alternatives. If that choice is adequately represent· 
ed by a best reply set of actions, then although the choice has distributive effects, 
these are of no concern to the choosers. It is, therefore, only when all best reply 
sets lead to sub-optimal outcomes, so that there are mutual advantaees to be found 
ln agreement or cooperation among persons, that considerations of distributive jus-
20 
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tice arise. Other moral considerations may arise in other contexts, but in restrict­
ing distributive justice to the context of mutually advantageous cooperation, we 
are following in the footsteps of Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls.11 
This restriction on the scope of considerations of distributive justice suggests 
that a state of affairs is just, if and only if those involved in i.t would justly have 
agreed to the set of actions bringing it about. We must make any reference to 
agreement hypothetical, since as I have pointed out, much of our social interaction 
which is at least partially cooperative involves no actual agreement or bargain. 
But we may replace our question about the justice of states of affairs by one 
about the justice of agreements, provided we recognize that "Would we agree ... ?'� 
rather than "Did we agree ... ?" is the appropriate way to introduce reference to 
such agreements. 
The justice of an agreement may be supposed to have two dimensions - one 
concerning the manner of agreement, the other concerning the matter or content 
of agreement. But we cannot strictly distinguish these dimensions since in the case 
of hypothetical agreement, manner reduces to matter. We might say that, eeteris 
paribus, an agreement is just in manner if and only if it is genuinely voluntary. But 
the nearest approximation to what is voluntary in the case of hypothetical agree­
ment, must be what is rationally acceptable. And so rationality and justice are 
inextricably intertwined in our account. 
But we may still reflect on the matter of agreement. And here, although 
rationality and justice are still intertwined, the connection is less direct. For we 
may say, quite without reference · to rationality, that a non-optimal agreement, 
in depriving someone of benefit unnecessarily, without gain to anyone else, is unfair 
to the person so deprived. It is unfair for me to be allowed to profit at another's 
expense, no doubt, but it is 'equally unfair to me not to be allowed to profit, 
if no one is worsened thereby. Thus optimality is a requirement of faJrness, and so 
of justice, as well as a req�rement of rationaJlty. 
And this is not aJl. It is unfair to profit at another's expense. How is this 
unfairness expressed in the context of agreement? Each person's utility range 
represents his or her possible gain. The expected utility of any proposed agreement 
may be represented as a proportion of that gain, and so represented, constitutes 
the relative advantage of the agreement to the person. Now one profits at another's 
expense insofar as one's own relative advantage can arise only if he or she accepts, 
not merely a lesser relative advantage, but one less than anyone need accept. Thus 
one would arrive at a fair agreement by maximizing the minimum relative advantage 
received by anyone. But the measure of relative advantage is such that for any 
agreement, the sum of one's relative advantage and one's concession equal unity. 
Thus maxlmin relative advantage is equivalent to minimax concession. And so the 
requirements of fairness and rationality coincide. A hypothetical agreement which 
is just in manner and fair in matter ls a rational agreement. 
The justice of an agreement has been characterized relatively to the set of 
possible agreements. In other words, a state of affairs is distributively just (or 
unjust) in relation to alternatives. The set of possible agreements is itself detmed 
relatively to the expected out<:ome of no agreement. Thus the justice or injustice 
of a state of affairs is determined against a baseline which provides a certain expect­
ed utility to each person, but which itself is not characterized as just or unjust. 
Any assessment, either of the range of possibilities, or of the baseline, falls out­
side the scope of considerations of distributive justice, except insofar as the assess· 
ment refers to other cooperative arrangements treated ln terms of hypothetical 
agreement. Such assessment thus constitutes part of the realm of speculative en-
21 
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quiry from which dlatributive justice is freed by its identification with rational 
choice. 
6� Why doea a rational bargain, or a mode ot cooperation which could be ration· 
all�ed In terms of a bargain, involve a moral constraint on action? An objector 
might plausibly argue that insofar as the point of a bargain ls to benefit all partiea 
to it, morality bu no place. Agreement and cooperation simply constitute an ex· 
tension of rational pni\ience. 
The apparent strength of this objection resta on ignoring the problem of 
compliance. Thia problem hu received attention from earlier theorista of juattce; 
although my concern here is not to dlscuu te:i:ta, a quotation from Hume may be 
illuminating. Hume, I should note, holds a general view of morality strongly op­
posed to the �one I have assumed; he supposes it to further, rather than to con· 
strain, each Individual's punuit of .his own intereata.12 But on this view he finds 
that justice preaenta a problem: 
''Treating vice with the greatest candour, ... there ls not, in any instance, 
the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view ot self· 
interest; except, perhaps, in the cue of jultice, where a man, taking things in a 
certain light, ·may often seem to be a loeer by his integrity . ... a aenaible knave, in 
particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity wtll make a 
considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any conalderable breach in 
the social . union and confederacy. That honesty ls the beat policy, may be a good 
I I 
general rule,. but ls liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps-be thought, 
conducts him.self with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes 
adv�tage of all the exceptions." 
"I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an 
answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfact­
ory and convincing. ••13 
Hume states the problem of compliance very clearly. Grant that it ls rational 
- or, to use bis terminology, preferred with a view to sell-Interest - to agree on a 
particular mode of cooperation in situatlona in which otherwtae external inefftcien· 
cies would prevent an optimal outcome. Grant· that one should adhere to such 
agreementa u a general rule, so that one avoids penalties, malntalna one's reputa· 
tion, and sets othen a 1ood example. Yet It ls nevertbeleaa advantageous to act on 
whatever opportunities will prove maximally profitable to oneself, includln1 op· 
portunities to violate one's agreementa. And so it is in some cues rational to vio­
la� agreements, even though It la unjtut. 
· I reject this conclusion. Adherence to one's qreements does indeed In some 
situations constitute a genuine constraint on preference-based choice. Were this 
not so, adherence would not be morally significant. But It ls not contrary to reason 
to adhere, insofar as one is, adhering to what is or would be a rational bargain. It 
one is to ove,rcome l�efficienciea by bargaining, then one muat be able to expect 
everyone to adhere to the bargained outcome. It is advantageous to overcome 
inetficienciea, advantageoua to do this by bargaining, advantageous therefore to 
be able to expect adherence to the outcome, and so, I maintain, rational to adhere 
to the outcome. Rationality ls tranamltted from making an agxeement, to keeping 
the qreement. 
Elsewhere I diacuaa Ulla matter at greater lenetb, areuln& that the conclusion 
I have just reached requires a modification ln the maximizing conception of ration· 
ality - a modiftcatlon which, however, it la rational to choOH.14 Thus rationality 
and morality are broueht Jnto harmony. Adherence to a rational bargain, one 
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resting on the principle of minimax concession, is just, and justice is both a req..µre. 
ment of reason, rightly understood, and an imperative of morality, constraining 
our preference-based choices. 
The principle of minimax concession is · thus both the object of rational 
choice for any person faced with external inefficiencies, and a ground of moral 
constraint. Characterizing all rational bargains and all modes of rational coop.era­
tion, it may itself be conceived as the outcome of a meta-bargain - of a supreme 
hypothetical agreement among all human beings who must interact in situations 
in whkh best reply sets of actions are sub-optimal. In accepting the principle of 
minimax concession, we bargain our way, not ·into particular moral arrangements, 
but into morality itself - or at least, into that part of morality constituted by 
distributive justice. 
7. The principle of minimax concession is applied against a baseline situation, 
and a range of possibilities which must each be mutually advantageous in relation 
to that baseline. In effect, both the characteristics and the existing circumstances 
of the persons involved are taken for. granted; they provide a framework which 
determines whether the principle of justice has any application. AB Hume noted, 
the relation between human beings and other creatures who, though rational, lack 
power to express effectively any resentment against human behaviour, does not 
involve the restraints of justice. Humans may act as they wil.l, and "as no Incon­
venience ever results from the e�erclse of a power, so fmnly established in nature, 
the restraints of justice and property, being totally useless, would never hav� place 
in so unequal a confederacy."15 Hume insisted that animals in relation to humans, 
barbarous Indians in relation to civilized Europeans, and in many nations the female 
sex in relation to the male, are iO a position of inferiority such that questions of jus­
tice and injustice simply do not arise. 
Hobbes� who saw in morality a rational response to the horrendous external 
inefficiencies of the state of nature, and Rawls, who supposed the principles of 
justice to be the objects of rational choice in circumstances "under which human 
cooperation is both possible and necessary," have both insisted that one must 
reason from an initial situation of equaiity.16 But this is no part of the present 
account - or of Hume's theory. Human beings are equally rational, and so all 
mw;t choose the same principle to regulate their interaction. The worry that one 
might tailor principles to bis· or her particular advantage can be seen to be un­
founded, once the formal constraints on choice are 1properly understQod. The real 
worry is that the principle applies to whatever situations do arise, so that; although 
we bargain our way into moral constraints, we do so from a purely amoral stance. 
When. we eliminate from our account all factors which do not fall within the do­
main of rational choice - when we eliminate, for example, either Rawls' specially 
favoured or Hobbes' specially disfavoured no agreement point - we find that 
distributive justice is an extremely weak constraint· on preference-based choice. 
An example - quite fictitious, of course - will help to clarify my point. 
Suppose a planet, ·the land mus of which consists of two large islands, widely 
separated by stormy seas. On each, human life - or life close enough to human 
for our purposes - has developed in complete independence and ignorance of the 
other. On one island, the Pµrple People have developed an ideally just society • 
Knowing the extent of their natural resources, they have adopted policies govern­
ing population, conservation, and development, to ensure, as far as they are able, 
that the worst-off person shall benefit, relative to his or her personal characteris· 
ti� and the possible modes of social cooperation, as much as poiisible, not only 
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in the present generation, but throughout their forseeable future. On the other 
island, the Green People live in totally chaotic squalor. Taking no thought for the 
morrow, they have propagated their kind and squandered their resources so that 
they are on the brink of catastrophic collapse. At this point in their respective 
histories, an exploration party from the Purple People discovers the Green People, 
and reports back on their condition. 
· 
Consensus among the Pun>le People is reached on the following points. First, 
any contact between Purple and Green will require Purple's initiative, since the 
Greens lack means of both transportation and communication across the ocean. 
Second, the combined resources of the two islands cannot support the combined 
populations at the level achieved by Purple society. Third, maximization of the 
average absolute level of planetary well-being would require a massive but techno­
logically feasible transfer of resources from Purples to Greens. And fourth, the 
Purple People have the capacity to eliminate the Green People- without any possi­
bility of significant retaliation. 
Four parties develop am')ng the Purple People. The first, whom I shall call 
Utilltarians, demand that the Purples give up·thelr comfortable way of life to res­
cue the Greens from impending catastrophe and maximize overall well-being. The 
second group propose that existing levels of well-being in the two societies be 
taken as a baseline, and the possibilities of mutually advantageous interchange be 
explored, in line with the principle of minimax concession.17 This policy, members 
of the group urgf!, will maximize the minimum gain relative to existing circum­
stances, and so will be ju.st. The third group argue that the strains of the cortinuing 
inequality between Purple and Greens envisaged in the policy proposed by the 
second group will outweigh ·any advantages from interchanges, and urge therefore 
that no contact be established with the Greens. Finally, the fourth group, whom I 
shall call Hobbists, argue �at the others mistakenly identify the baseline with the 
existing situation rather than yith the outcome of no. agreement. Whatever the 
Greens may seek to do, the best action for the Purples is to eliminate the Greens 
and appropriate their resources. There is no place for mutually advantageous agree­
ment, and 110 for consideration of justice. 
Let us reflect on these proposals. In my view, many existing moral theories 
accept· far too strong constraints on the maximization of individual utility. Advo­
cates of such theories would find themselves committed to the individually and 
socially sacrificial policies of the Utilitarian Purples. But not one of us acts on the 
counterpart of suC'h policies. It is, however, a long step between supposing that 
one would be literally mad if one took utllitartanism seriously in practice, and 
supposing that we should accept only that part of morality which can be salvaged 
with our theory of distributive justice. For we should then be committed to the 
annihUative policies of. the Hobblst Purples, since they recognl� that the Purples 
have no reason to cooperate in any way with the Greens, but rather every reason 
to eliminate them and acquire their resources. 
Of course, it is possible that humanitarian feelings would not only hold the 
Purple People back from tne Hobbist policy, _but would make that policy actually 
less satisfying than one of the alternatives. But surely we should want to say that 
it would be wrong for the Purples to annihilate the Greens, even if the Purples take 
no interest whatsoever in the Greens' interests, or feel no.emotional concern· at all. 
1b.e Greens, we might even say, have rights, which would be violated were the 
Purples to annihilate them.18 There are moral constraints which the Purples should 
recolJll?.e, stronger than any which are generated by mutual advantage. 
Either the Purple People should cooperat.e with the Greens, taking their 
24 
11
Gauthier: Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It-Yourself
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1979
D1Yid Gauthier 
present situations as the b�line, or they should leave them alone. Which they 
should do depends, in my view, on empirical, psychological considerations about 
the strains ot a continuing, unequal relationship. This is an isaue In moral psychol­
ogy, but not directly in moral philosophy. But to defend this position, I require 
something akin to Nozick'& well-known Lockean proviso, as a constraint on the 
baseline from which mutual advantage is to be determined.19 In the absence of 
such a constraint, I see no defense against the Hobbist who insists that the inequal­
ity in power between Purples and Greens makes any moral relationship, any moral 
constraint, lrntional. 
'lbua I come to both an optimistic and a pessimistic conclusion. The optimis­
tic conclusion ls that the argument which I have p�sented grounds a part, and a not 
unimportant part, of traditional morality, on a strictly rational footing. Using 
only the weak conceptions of value as individual preference-satisfaction, and of 
rationality as maximizing preference�tisfaction, I have established the rationality 
of distributive justice, .as that constraint on preference-based choice required by 
minimax concesaion. 
The pessimistic conclusion ls that no similar �ent will put the remainder, 
or any important part of the remainder, of traditional· morality on a similarly 
rational· footin1. I have not thown this, but we may easily see that the only con· 
straints on p:reference-based choice which are compatible with our conceptions of 
value and reason must be those which it is mutually advantageous for us to accept, 
and these are simply the constraints required by minimax concession. Having 
abandoned· all religious or metaphysical props for morality, we are left with no 
justification for principles some,of which, at least, we are unwilling to abandon. 
Related to these conclusions are two opposed views of our society. The 
optimistic view is that modem Western society is, so far, unique in its recognition 
that the sole purposes for which coercive authority ls justified among human 
beings are, tint, to overcome the force and fraud which are the great external 
inefflclencles ln the state of nature, thus making possible the emergence of the 
free, competitive market, and second, to assure the efficacy of those modes of 
cooperation which are required to avoid those public bads and attain those public 
goods which the free activity of the market wlll not provide. Until corrupted by the 
utllltarlan and egalitarian ideas which have led to th� welfare state, our society 
was beginning, for the fint time In human history, to make It possible for hwman 
affairs to be guided by reuon and justice. 
1be peulmlstlc view is that modem Western society has abandoned f!Ver/ 
justification for coercive authority and for constrain ta on preference· based choice 
save that which stems from consideration of ·mutual advantage, thereby .opening 
the way to the dissolution of � those genuinely social bonds among human beings 
which are the neceuary cement of any viable public order. That there is a rational 
:resolution of the problem of compliance is of little concern. to human beings for 
whom reuon is the slave of the passions, and who, freed from traditional con· 
stralnta, face a rapid decline into the state of natui'e conceived as the war of every 
penon against eveey person.20 
'Ihere ls a schl7.ophrenia in these conclusions which I find haunting the core 
of my moral and polJtlcal theory. Perhaps we exceed both our hopes and our fean 
in bargaining our way Into morality. 
· 
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